The Forgetting of Being

The Forgotten Basic Question in Our Technological Era

”Peasant Shoes” - Vincent van Gogh 1886, Van Gogh Museum, Amsterdam

Das Wesen der Technik ist auf keinen Fall irgend etwas Technisches. - Martin Heidegger

Introduction

Through my trilogy of essays, I was inspired to conduct more in-depth and fundamental research into the relationship between humanity and technology. To fully comprehend this relationship means studying Heidegger.

Martin Heidegger, a German philosopher (1889-1976), fundamentally changed philosophy by returning to the forgotten question of Being itself rather than just beings. His analysis of technology showed how our modern technical approach to the world threatens to reduce everything, including humans, to mere resources to be optimized and utilized.

As I prepared to read Heidegger's own texts, particularly "The Question Concerning Technology," (Die Frage nach der Technik). I decided to first immerse myself in the contextual framework. To prepare for Heidegger's complex text, I purchased Gerard Visser's commentary on the work.

While reading Visser's book, I became fascinated by the various concepts of being that have emerged from the philosophical tradition. It became clear to me that these ideas are more than just academic abstractions; they are fundamental ways in which we relate to reality, and thus to the technology that is increasingly shaping that reality.

In this essay, I'd like to focus on Heidegger’s principle of 'the forgetting of Being' (Seinsvergessenheit), while also walking you through the evolution of thinking about being. I'll focus on Heidegger's return to the ancient Greeks for his questions about being and technology, as well as the significant differences between Heidegger and Nietzsche's conceptions of being and perspectives on nihilism and existentialism.

PS: I still need to study the full text of Die Frage nach der Technik but wanted to at least already share my exploration on the topic of Being in relation to technology.

The Forgotten and Essential Fundamental Questions of Philosophy

The term "the forgetting of Being" (Seinsvergessenheit) refers to the loss of the distinction between Being and beings. Heidegger argues that Western metaphysics has forgotten Being itself in favor of beings (existing concrete entities such as people, animals, and objects). Being is not something that exists, but rather the necessary condition for making existence possible.

This may seem abstract, but it has far-reaching implications for how we perceive reality, ourselves, and technology. According to Heidegger, forgetting Being is more than a philosophical mistake; it is a fundamental development that pervades Western history and culminates in our technological age.

When Heidegger discusses the question of being, he places it within the context of what he refers to as the "Grundfragen," or fundamental philosophical questions. In his book "Einführung in die Metaphysik" (Introduction to Metaphysics), Heidegger raises four fundamental questions:

1. Why is there something instead of nothing? - According to Heidegger, this is the most fundamental question, preceding all others. It is a question of Being itself, or why there is anything at all.

2. What exactly does being mean? - The question of the essence or nature of being, or what it means to exist.

3. How does it compare with Being? - The question of the meaning or sense of Being, and how it relates to our comprehension of it.

4. Who is a man? - The question of man's essence as the being capable of posing the question of being, and who understands Being.

The first question is why there is something rather than nothing. -is the most fundamental. It confronts us with the wonder that there is something rather than nothing, a wonder that we completely overlook in our daily interactions with beings and our technical-scientific approach to reality.

The forgetting of Being stems from the fact that Western philosophy's most fundamental question has gradually faded into the background. Rather than asking the question of Being itself, philosophy has focused on the second question (what is being?), thereby ignoring Being itself. Leibniz's famous question, "Why is there something rather than nothing?" was quickly transformed into a question about a first cause, a higher being, God, thereby evading the actual question of being.

Reopening these fundamental questions, particularly the question of Being itself, is, according to Heidegger, the task of contemporary thinking. Not as an academic exercise, but as an in-depth confrontation with what is most important to us. For Heidegger, man is the being who relates to his own being, can ask the question of being, and is affected by it. In this sense, the question of being is both the most fundamental philosophical question and the most existential one, as it touches on the essence of what it means to be human.

From the Greeks to Descartes: A History of Forgetting

To understand what we have forgotten, we must go back to the beginning. Among the early Greek thinkers, particularly the Presocratics, there was still a strong sense of what 'being' meant.

The Greeks viewed Being (Einai, εἶvαι) as a revelation or event. Parmenides summarized this in his famous statement "Being is." Being (To on, τὸ ὄν) referred to that which is; for Plato, it was the reflection of ideas, and for Aristotle, it was substance with properties.

This Greek approach to being was based on direct experience with the world rather than abstraction and theory. There was still no clear distinction between subject and object, or between man and nature. Aristotle defined man as a political being (zoon politikon) who was always in community and an integral part of a meaningful cosmos.

However, with the rise of modern thought, particularly the Cartesian worldview, this approach shifted dramatically.

Cartesian thinking, named after René Descartes (1596-1650), reduced being to the certainty of consciousness. Descartes' famous statement "cogito ergo sum" (I think, therefore I am) established the importance of thinking. Being became objective presence.

This way of thinking is distinguished by methodical doubt, as Descartes began with radical doubt about everything we know or believe before arriving at unquestionable certainty. He distinguished between thinking substance (res cogitans) and extended substance (res extensa), or mind and matter, and viewed the physical world as a mechanism that operates on mathematical principles.

This Cartesian turning point marked, according to Heidegger, a decisive phase in the forgetting of Being. The world was reduced to objects that stand opposite a thinking subject. Being was no longer experienced as a disclosure (revelation) but as merely objective presence that can be measured, calculated, and controlled.

Present-at-hand versus Ready-to-hand: Two Ways of Experiencing the World

One of Heidegger's most illuminating insights is his distinction between two fundamental ways in which we encounter the things around us: as 'present-at-hand' (Vorhandenheit) or as 'ready-to-hand' (Zuhandenheit).

The dominant mode of being in Cartesian thinking is present-at-hand (Vorhandenheit), which views the world as a collection of objective things with properties. It is the foundation of scientific contemplation, in which objects are only present as theoretical objects of contemplation - an ontologically derivative mode, according to Heidegger.

However, in our everyday lives, we experience things in a different, more direct way:

Ready-to-hand (Zuhandenheit) refers to things as we encounter them in practical use; tools that do not impose themselves when used. It is related to what Aristotle referred to as 'techne' and practical knowledge (phronesis).

When I'm hammering, I don't think of the hammer as an object with specific properties, weight, and dimensions. In use, the hammer 'disappears'; I am focused on nailing rather than the hammer itself. Only when the hammer breaks or proves unsuitable for the task does it become 'present-at-hand' - an object that must be examined.

Our modern, technological-scientific worldview, however, consistently favors the present-at-hand. We perceive the world primarily as a collection of objects that can be measured, analyzed, and manipulated. This attitude has resulted in enormous technological progress, but it has also caused us to forget something important: our original, engaged way of being in the world.

Dasein: Our Unique Being in the World

Heidegger employs the term 'Dasein' (literally: being-there) to describe the human being's relationship to its own being. Unlike Descartes, who reduced man to a thinking subject (cogito) with a distinction between subject and object as a starting point, Heidegger sees man as fundamentally being-in-the-world.

Being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-sein) is Heidegger's fundamental mode of being for Dasein. Man is always engaged with the world, rather than being a subject who then enters it.

This approach fundamentally contradicts the Cartesian viewpoint. We are not primarily thinking subjects perceiving an objective world; rather, we are always immersed in a meaningful world of care and engagement. Our relationship with the world is not primarily a theory of knowledge, but existential.

This brings us to a critical distinction in our way of being.

The 'they-self' (das Man) is an inauthentic mode of existence in which we conform to social norms and avoid our own mortality. It is comparable to Nietzsche's concept of 'herd morality.'

The 'authentic self' (eigentliches Selbst), on the other hand, is the genuine mode of existence in which we seize our own opportunities while confronted with our own limitations. It recalls Socrates' 'know thyself' (gnothi seauton) and Aristotle's eudaimonia as the ultimate goal.

Heidegger and Nietzsche: Being and Nihilism

Heidegger's complex relationship with Nietzsche is an especially fascinating aspect of his thinking. According to Heidegger, the forgetting of Being reaches its peak in Nietzsche's thinking, although Nietzsche himself did not characterize it as such.

In Nietzsche's philosophy, the traditional concept of being is replaced by the "Will to Power." Existence is seen as interpretation, perspectivism, becoming instead of being. Nietzsche criticizes essences as fictions; for him, there are only interpretations and no fixed essences. He emphasizes existence as primary over essence and argues an affirmative "yes-saying" to life.

The fundamental difference between Heidegger and Nietzsche is their approach to nihilism. For Nietzsche, nihilism is a historical process whereby the highest values invalidate themselves. His "God is dead" declaration marks the exhaustion of the metaphysical tradition and the necessity to create new values. The Übermensch is the one who shapes himself without external authority and lives in the face of nihilism.

For Heidegger, on the other hand, nihilism cannot be overcome by a heroic revaluation of all values but is rooted in the forgetting of Being itself. Nihilism is not a historical process but the fundamental structure of Western metaphysics, which forgets Being itself and thereby reduces everything to manipulable objects.

What makes Nietzsche's position so complex in Heidegger's analysis is that he, on the one hand, radically breaks with the metaphysical tradition, but on the other hand represents its completion. According to Heidegger, by reducing Being to a perspectival interpretation, "Will to Power," Nietzsche moves beyond the original question of Being itself.

Here we also see an important difference in their existentialist views. Nietzsche's existentialism is based on a radical freedom to create values in a world without inherent meaning. Heidegger's existentialism, on the other hand, is based on a rediscovery of our original involvement with Being, an involvement that precedes all theory formation and value creation.

Onto-theology: Heidegger's Critique of the Metaphysical Tradition

Before delving into Heidegger's return to the Greeks, it's worth pausing to consider his concept of 'onto-theo-logy,' which he uses to describe the structure of Western metaphysics. This term summarizes what Heidegger considers to be the fundamental problem in our philosophical tradition.

According to Heidegger, Western metaphysics since Plato and Aristotle has assumed a double structure:

1. As ontology, metaphysics seeks the most fundamental being, what all beings have in common (being as such).

2. As theology, it seeks the highest being, the most perfect being that forms the ground for all other beings (God, the first cause, etc.).

Heidegger refers to this double structure as the 'onto-theo-logical constitution of metaphysics.' The issue here is that Being itself is repeatedly reduced to a being in this approach, whether it is a fundamental or highest being. Being as such, as an event or disclosure, fades from view.

In the onto-theo-logical tradition, Being is understood as ground or foundation, as something that is 'present' and 'present-at-hand.' Whether it is Plato's Ideas, Aristotle's substance, Descartes' subjectivity, Hegel's Absolute Spirit, or Nietzsche's Will to Power – again and again, Being is reduced to a being, to something that can be understood and controlled within the metaphysical framework.

According to Heidegger, this onto-theological structure is not accidental or arbitrary, but rather inherent in Western metaphysics. It is the Western man's attempt to understand and control reality, and it serves as the foundation for our modern technological control of the world.

In onto-theology, God is regarded as the highest cause, the ultimate foundation of all beings. However, even in atheistic or secular metaphysics, such as that of Marx or Nietzsche, this structure persists: the role of God is replaced by other 'first principles' or 'highest values', such as Matter, Will to Power, or, in our time, Information or the Algorithm.

Heidegger's critique of onto-theo-logy is not primarily a religious critique (for or against the existence of God), but a being-philosophical one: it is directed at the way we think about Being itself. His plea for a 'other beginning' of thinking is an attempt to go beyond this onto-theo-logical structure and to experience Being anew as an event, as that which cannot be reduced to a being, however fundamental or high.

Return to the Greeks: Heidegger's Search for Another Beginning

This critique of onto-theology explains Heidegger's return to ancient Greece. This is not a romantic longing for a lost golden age, but an attempt to find another, non-metaphysical beginning of thinking that goes beyond the onto-theo-logical structure.

Heidegger conducts extensive research on Presocratic thinkers, particularly Parmenides and Heraclitus, because he believes that Being had not yet been forgotten. According to him, their cryptic fragments demonstrate a more original experience of Being as disclosure (aletheia), as an event in which man participates rather than as an object standing opposite a subject.

This return to the Greeks is particularly relevant to Heidegger's question about technology. In modern technology, Heidegger sees not just a collection of instruments, but a specific disclosure of reality – what he calls the 'Gestell' (framework or enframing). To understand this modern technical disclosure, he returns to the Greek notion of technē (τέχνη), which implies not only instrumentality but also a form of knowing and revealing.

The difference between Greek technē and modern technology is, according to Heidegger, not a matter of complexity or effectiveness, but of the fundamental way in which they reveal reality. Where technē was a way to bring nature to its own unfolding, modern technology is primarily aimed at making demands on nature, at transforming everything into a 'standing-reserve' (Bestand) of resources that can be called upon at will.

The Technological Disclosure: A Special Form of Being-Forgetfulness

What makes our current age special in this story of the forgetting of Being? Heidegger defines 'Gestell' (often translated as 'framework' or 'enframing') as a specific form of being-forgetfulness that manifests in modern technology.

In the technological age, the world primarily appears as a 'standing-reserve' (Bestand) – a stock of raw materials and energy that is available on demand. Not only nature, but also man, is viewed as a resource to be optimized and utilized.

This explains why we are struggling so much with questions about meaning and purpose in our current era. If everything, including ourselves, is viewed primarily as a resource, what is the distinct value and meaning of being human?

The crisis of meaning in our modern society is thus not an unintended consequence of technological advancement. It is a symptom of a deeper forgetting of Being that is reinforced by the technological 'disclosure' of reality.

Beyond Forgetting Being: Towards a New Engagement

Heidegger's diagnosis may sound dim, but his thinking also provides perspectives for a new relationship with technology and a renewed engagement with the question of being.

Overcoming the forgetting of Being begins with a renewed awareness of our original connection to the world - not as a collection of objects opposing us, but as a meaningful context in which we are always already entangled. It calls for a revaluation of other forms of knowledge than the merely technical-scientific, such as the practical wisdom (phronesis) described by Aristotle.

Heidegger sees poetry and art as ways to regain access to a more original experience of Being. Not as a romantic escape from technological reality, but as a means of cultivating a richer, more nuanced relationship with reality.

This is not to say we should reject technology. On the contrary, it is about understanding technology in its purest form - not as a collection of tools, but as a specific way in which reality reveals itself to us. Understanding the fundamental structure of technology allows us to approach it more freely while keeping other options open.

Rediscovering the Question of Being in the Age of AI

In an age when artificial intelligence increasingly mimics and, in some cases, surpasses human capabilities, Heidegger's question of being becomes more urgent than ever. The advancement of these intelligent systems raises fundamental questions about what it means to be human in ways that no previous technology has.

Now that AI systems can 'think,' 'learn,' 'create,' and even 'decide,' we must reconsider what makes these activities uniquely human. Is human thinking fundamentally different from an artificial intelligence system's pattern recognition and prediction models? What is the distinction between human creativity and algorithmically generated art or music? These questions are not merely technical or practical in nature, but they get to the heart of the question of being: what is the mode of being for humans versus an intelligent machine?

This confrontation with AI provides us with a unique opportunity to move beyond the forgetting of Being. By being confronted with "intelligent" systems that simulate human cognition without a body, without a history, without a sense of mortality, we are thrown back upon the question of what characterizes human being in its fullness and authenticity. This encompasses not only cognition, but also embodiment, finitude, involvement, care, and the possibility of genuine or inauthentic existence.

Rediscovering the question of being in an age of artificial intelligence may be one of our time's most important tasks. This requires us to move beyond purely technical and ethical discussions about AI and into the ontological dimension: how does AI affect our understanding of Being and our way of being? How does it affect our interactions with the world and with one another? And, in the midst of this transformation, how can we develop a richer, more multifaceted understanding of humanity that is not limited to what machines can simulate?

Heidegger's insight that we are always already involved in a meaningful world of engagement before we begin to think theoretically provides an important counterweight to the idea that human intelligence is nothing more than information processing. The human is more than just an information processing system; it is a being that cares about itself and lives in a world full of meaning and possibilities.

Overcoming the forgetting of being in the AI era does not require us to reject technology or harbor nostalgic longings for a pre-technological past. Nor does it imply that we should regard the advancement of AI as an existential threat. It does imply that we must contextualize this development within a broader understanding of what it means to be human, one that includes but is not limited to technical-scientific insights.

In this sense, the confrontation with artificial intelligence allows us to rethink the question of Being, and perhaps find a new, richer beginning - not outside, but within our technological world. This rediscovered question of Being can assist us in developing technology that is not only efficient and powerful, but also allows for the many aspects of human being that cannot be reduced to calculation and control.

Thus, rediscovering the question of Being becomes more than a philosophical task; it is a practical necessity in a world where technology mediates and shapes more and more aspects of our existence. Taking on this challenge reveals perhaps the most profound meaning of what it means to be human in the age of artificial intelligence.

A Future Experiment

Soon I will begin a small experimental project in which I explore precisely these questions. By setting up a specialized experiment with a large language model, I hope to investigate how introducing concepts like finitude, limitation, and self-consciousness influences the behavior and response of AI systems. The results and reflections from this experiment will be the subject of a future essay, in which I will analyze the philosophical implications of this confrontation between existentialist concepts and modern AI.